Economic Neoliberalism
Became Almost Irrelevant...
By: Grzegorz W. Kolodko
New development policies are emerging in after 10 years of experience with the
transition process. Both theoreticians and policymakers are revising earlier theories
about the market-state relationship, scrutinizing privatization processes, tackling
deregulation arrangements with a fresh attitude, and attempting to deal with the
far-reaching consequences of globalization. The World Bank is at the forefront of this
revision process. Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Polands first vice prime minister and finance
minister between 1994 and 1997, is a visiting fellow in the Banks Development
Research Group. Having gained both theoretical underpinning from years of studies on
transition issues while a professor at the Warsaw School of Economics and Yale University,
and practical experience as a policymaker, he is currently working on a study titled
"Transition to a Market and Sustained Growth: Implications for the Post-Washington
Consensus." Revision of the Washington Consensus was a major topic of the following
interview with Transition editor Richard Hirschler.
Q. There are more and more signs that we have entered the era of post-Washington
Consensus. It would help to clarify what the Washington Consensus meant in the first
place.
A. The transition strategies in Eastern Europe and in the states of the former
Soviet Union have been based, and in some countries still are largely based, on the
so-called Washington Consensus. Originally the Consensus was a response to Latin
Americas structural crisis in the 1980s, a kind of policy advice agreed in
Washington between important organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury. It had the following message: "Liberalize as
much as you can, privatize as fast as you can, and be tough in fiscal and monetary
matters!" This policy advice has been appliedmainly through the IMF and the
World Bankto the transition economies. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid
to their distinguising characteristics.
Western experts assumed that these postsocialist economies simply were affected by
financial disequilibria, nonper-forming debt, and high inflation similar to the distorted
economies of Latin America. But these countries had system-specific defects: these were
shortage-ridden economies (in some cases 100 percent owned by the state), economies
without any type of market organizations or institutions. Western advisers also preferred
to believe that market institutionseven if they were unsophisticated,
underdeveloped, or in any embryonic statewere present in these economies. Its
by no means a coincidence that the few countries that had some earlier experience with
marketsHungary, Poland, and Slovenia (Yugoslavia) includedwere able to
overcome their transition pains much faster than the others. For the other economies the
erroneous advice of international institutions cost dearly in loss of national wealth,
economic mismanagement, wasted resources, and social misery. It became obvious that
without proper institutional arrangements, liberalization and privatization can produce
problemsas is now the case in Russia and Ukraine, for example.
Q. So what should be the major features of a hopefully "gentler and
kinder" post-Washington Consensus?
A. Primarily, the governments role has to be put in its proper place. The
international institutions realized that the real question is not whether a government is
big or small, but whether a government is able to provide leadership, introduce right
policies, or is unable to do so. Thus the state must remain active in shaping a
countrys political-economic policy, not as an owner of assets or an administrator of
state companies, but as an architect of institutional arrangements, as a guard of
financial fundamentals, as an investor in the human capital, as a financier for
infrastructure development, and as a manager of global integration. I would like to
highlight three areas that need to be addressed:
· Taking care of financial and economic fundamentals. Here I do not differ from IMF
orthodoxy or a classical mainstream liberal approach. Fiscal balance has to be restored,
current account has to be sustainable, inflation has to be brought down, liberalization
has to proceed vis-a-vis prices and trade, and privatization has to be completed.
· Creating and maintaining institutions, such as antitrust agencies and laws,
commercial and investment banking, social safety nets, securities exchange
commissions, and re-regulation of capital markets. The negligence of institutional
arrangements has been a grave miscalculation of the orthodox approach, for example, in
Russia. If the governments are unable to set up institutions that can facilitate market
economies, a "neither plan nor market" situation can arisea systemic
vacuum that will be filled in by informal arrangements. It can be run by organized crime
or fraudulent financial intermediaries, such as the managers of Albanias financial
pyramids. Russias seven tycoonsheads of the countrys seven
industrial-financial-media empiresfunction as a "shadow government,"
combining their enormous economic power with wide-scale political influence. The price is
paid by the majority of the society. It also demonstrates that there is a link between the
lack of proper institutional arrangements, on the one hand, and widening inequality and
growing poverty, on the other hand.
· Investing in human capital. To assume that the market per se takes care of its
education needs is wrong. Postsocialist economies have no organizations, no networks, and
most important, not enough private resources for that. Many parents cannot afford to send
their children to high schools, vocational schools, or universities or even to retrain and
redeploy themselves if necessary, therefore, the government has to take over these tasks.
Thus the role of government, especially in the postsocialist transition economies,
seems to be on the rise. It contradicts the intentions of the neoliberal approach that
didnt have much to say to the government, except that it should "liberalize
everything, privatize everything, and then pull back." However, governments can fail
or succeed, but they cannot afford to pull back. What should pull back instead is
neoliberalism as an economic theory and, especially, as an economic policy.
Q. Would you say then that neoliberalism, as an economic ideology and policy, has
become irrelevant?
A. Almost. Not completely yet, but hopefully soon. There is good reason to
expect such an outcome after the harm that this train of economic thought and policy has
caused in the final decade of the twentieth century. And not only by mishandling
transition issues in postsocialist economies, but also by economic mismanagement in the
aftermath of the East Asia crisis.
Q. Thus the revised, enlarged role of governments is an important feature of the
post-Washington arrangement. But wouldnt the East Asia crisis warrant doubts about
the soundness of governments judgement?
A. I dont think so. The message is clear: the market has failed more so
than the state. I wouldnt claim that governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
or the Republic of Korea didnt make mistakes. They have to learn the hard way that
certain policies dont work. But much of the blame for the contagion of the Asia
crisis can be put on the panicking markets. The problem is the lack of proper regulation
of capital flow that should be re-regulated instead of being even more deregulated.
Q. Consequently, should the effects of globalization also be included in the
post-Washington Consensus?
A. Absolutely. This is the most sensitive element of the post-Washington
Consensus. Whether we want it or not, hardly any major decision or policy can be executed
in the worldbe it in Moscow or Bangkok, Budapest or Jakartawithout
international backing, primarily from Washington, D.C., the location of the World Bank,
the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, Congress, and other influential organizations and think tanks.
Globalization reached a point where governments are not able to resist the rapid
fluctuations of the international capital flows alone. Countries in East Asia watched
helplessly as the market panicked and more than $100 billion left the region in a blitz.
To say, "fix the fundamentals, privatize whatever has been left for privatization,
overhaul the banking sector, get rid of fiscal deficit, sustain the exchange rate, and
bring the inflation down," is not enough for the post-Washington Consensus we are
searching for. In Malaysia it wasnt enough, so it will not work in Russia either.
Thus not only weak governments but large speculative portfolio investors also threaten
economic stability and sustainable development. Therefore, paramount international
institutions, such as the IMF, have to step in, advising and supporting governments in
their efforts to regulate capital flow, for example, through maturity requirements and
taxation.
Q. You claim that as Polands deputy prime minister and finance minister
between 1994 and 1997, you were able to achieve a "therapy without shock,"
contrary to the "shock therapy" that characterized Polands economic policy
in the early 1990s. What were the major differences between your policy approach and your
predecessors?
A. During 199497 Polands GDP grew by more than 28 percent, inflation
fell by two-thirds, unemployment dropped from 3 million to 2 million, the accumulated
inflow of foreign capital exceeded 16 billion dollars, andas the Wall Street Journal
put itPoland had to face a new challenge: managing success. Contrary to the opinion
of many observers, what really mattered was the efficiency of the policy and not the dose
of radicalism or gradualism. Although it is true that, under our stewardship, lots of
measures, including deregulation, destatization, and denationalization of the economy,
gradually mitigated the negative social effects of these changes. We have been extremely
radical if justified and quite gradual when it was necessary, depending on the challenge.
Also, and that is a crucial institutional difference, we strongly opposed the approach
that claimed that the best industrial policy is not having one at all. We in the
government have actively and deliberately supported the restructuring of Polish
enterprises. I am pleased that the succeeding Solidarity-led government has not abandoned
industrial policyfor example, the restructuring of the steel and coal
industrieseven if they have to coordinate it with the European Union.
We have also paid great attention to institutional arrangements. Those were introduced
simultaneously with further privatization and liberalization, to facilitate the emerging
private capital, assist in capital formation, and help to improve efficiency without an a
priori assumption that the market will do the job. A Polish joke illustrates the point
well: How many experts were needed under a centrally planned economy to replace a light
bulb? Three. One worked on the plan, another replaced the bulb, and the third drafted a
report. How many experts do we need under the market regime? None. The market will do the
job (my predecessors also believed that). I said we still needed somebody to replace the
bulb. That makes a huge difference. That is what distinguishes our program, known as
Strategy for Poland, implemented in 199497, as "therapy without shock"
from the "shock therapy," exercised in Poland at the onset of the 1990s.1
Q. Do you think that this reassessment of the Washington Consensus will change the
attitude and approach of international finance institutions, including the World Bank?
A. Following the temper and tone of discussions in Washington, which included
the Bretton Woods organizations, I am convinced that the priorities and the emphasis have
been shifted. For example, a recent IMF conference on economic policy and equity,
organized by Vito Tanzi and Stanley Fischer, was attended not only by distinguished
experts of the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank, and scholars from Harvard and
Oxford Universities, but also by trade union representatives and archbishops, including a
secretary of the Vatican Council for Justice and Peace. I said that if the Fund was going
to take care of equity and the Vatican, efficiency, I preferred to keep it in the old
way...
But seriously, it is clear that the Fund is paying more attention to equity, not only
because it now believes that the fruits of the growing economy should be shared more
fairly, but also because if they are distributed more equally it works on behalf of
sustained growth. The World Bank now focuses more on how to sustain growth, with the
broadest possible participation of social groups, and has been working out new, more
productive relationships with the governments as well. World Bank President James
Wolfensohn envisions the Bank as an organization that disseminates knowledge worldwide,
that functions as a teaching and learning institution. Senior Vice President and Chief
Economist Joseph Stiglitz has provided a detailed analysis of this new policy design.
Q. In your studies you often refer to the big mistake of confusing policy goals with
policy means.
A. The Washington Consensus sometimes confused the ends and the
means, as Joe Stiglitz revealed several times. While searching for a post-Washington
Consensus, policymakers have to consider three major rates: interest rate, exchange rate,
and tax rate, but above all, respect a fourth rate: the electoratethe people. The
aim of economic policy is not fiscal prudence, or stable exchange rates, or low taxation,
or deregulation. These are the means that should ensure the final goal: sustainable
development and the well-being of the people.