From the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, technocrats are triumphant. Despite differences in
the economic and political evolution of the Latin American countries during the last decades, they
share one trend: increasing number of economic and financial experts taking key positions at the
highest levels of the decision making process. Called by a variety of names ranging from técnicos,
tecnócratas, to Chicago Boys or technopols, these new actors have come to dominate economic
policymaking in a variety of countries since the 1960s.   
In the 1990s, their power in these realms is almost monolithic. More impressively, they
appear to have increasing control over political as well as technical institutions. Where before the
autonomy of these economic experts was often constrained by either military masters or populist
politicians, experts now independently determine their nations’ fates. This book analyzes these
strategic players on the Latin American stage. 
This analysis is not only relevant to our understanding of contemporary issues, but also
may contribute to the study of Latin American political history. This is not the first time such
experts have appeared.  Depending on the country, positivist predecessors played important roles
in the consolidation of Latin American states in the late Nineteenth Century (Burns, 1980). Decades
later, again depending on the case, they surfaced often accompanied by U.S. and European “money
doctors”  (Drake, 1989; 1994). Although their ideological stripes varied, they played important roles
in the creation of Latin American developmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s (Kay, 1989; Sikkink,
1991). Finally, their immediate predecessors were closely associated with the authoritarian regimes
of the 1970s (O'Donnell, 1973; Collier, 1979). We believe that a closer look at the respective ideologies
and cultural frameworks of these experts will help us better understand these periods in Latin
American history.   
Given their importance, it is surprising how little has been written in Latin America about
experts and their political roles. While some individual country studies of technocratic and
neoliberal policymaking exist (Silva, 1991; Centeno, 1994; Conaghan and Malloy, 1994), no systemic
and explicitly comparative analysis of these actors has been done. Some may argue that precisely
because their rise is so generalized in the region, they do not represent an interesting sociological or
political phenomenon. The argument is that experts are in power simply because they are needed
and that Latin America is finally making economic and political sense. Conversely, others suggest
that the experts are merely representatives or the most visible manifestations of deeper or more
structural determinencies; technocrats  are not where the action is.
We argue that whatever the merits of their functional necessity or constraints facing
policymakers in the late 1990s, the composition of decision making circles is important. It matters
for economic policies in the continent and it matters for the form and content of the new
democracies in the process of consolidation. Regardless of the limits of structural autonomy,
political elites help define how these constraints are perceived and confronted.    
Defining Technocrats
Much of the conference on which this book is based focused on the traditional definitional
dilemma: who is an technocrat and what does he or she do?  We have not enforced a single
language or definition since, despite some variance, all the authors agreed on the general and most
salient characteristics of the subject of study.  The most common view of technocratic experts is as
personnel who use their claim to knowledge (as opposed to representation or authoritarian control)
to affirm their right to rule.  In this introduction, we want to focus on the institutional and cultural
context of such claims. 
Much of previous scholarly work has focused on the technocrats' qualifications and/or
position within a social structure. Relatively little analysis has been done on the manner in which
these experts actually govern, or on the manner in which their political surroundings help shape
policy outcomes. This book emphasizes the institutional environment in which these experts work.
While politicians, at least initially, derive their power from the support of key segments of the
population or from participation in organizations which obtain such support, technocrats derive
theirs from success in organizational settings far removed from interactions with the population. A
politician may not be liked and respected, but he is identified as representing the interests or
aspirations of some social group. For the technocrat, on the other hand, such popular support is
immaterial as his career is in the hands of his hierarchical superiors. This implies that it is impossible
to separate macro or national political economy from micro bureaucratic politics. In some, if not all
the cases, the latter may be decisive.   
Technocratic institutions may be differentiated from their political equivalents because, in
principle, they do not directly or nominally involve the representation of particular interests. They
are concerned with the formulation of policy for the state as a whole, as opposed to the
representation of one segment thereof. Keeping in mind potential limitations on their autonomy,
they also derive their power not from the satisfaction of these particularistic demands, but from
their ability to fulfill their specified functions (cf. Fischer, 1990). It is also important to distinguish
between technocratic institutions and their more limited administrative or technical counterparts.
Technocratic institutions have greater autonomy and decision making capacity. Where the latter are
limited to the management of policy implementation in their substantive areas, technocratic
institutions are capable of influencing overall policy formulation and play a major role in
determining which alternatives are selected (cf. Evans, 1995).
Technocratic institutions' functional bailiwick may appear technically constrained, but the
critical importance of their substantive responsibilities or the centrality of their organizational
position allows them to escape the limits of bureaucratic obedience. If technocratic institutions share
certain basic characteristics, they differ depending on the political context in which they find
themselves. Autonomy and influence will often have little to do with the expertise in and of itself,
and much more to do with a) domestic political configurations and b) the relative importance of
international players. In general, these chapters would indicate that expertise may make a difference
in how power is wielded, but not in how it is obtained.   
In this book, we also seek to define how the professional experience of these experts
contributes to a political, social, and economic perspective. Borrowing from the new work in
economic sociology (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; Powell and DiMaggio, 1992) we assert that
culture matters and that the cultural frameworks shared by these experts help to explain their
actions. In the chapters that follow, a variety of authors define and analyze the technocratic world
view or “cosmology” and explore both its origins and consequences.     We suggest that an elite
culture links all of the different historical apparitions of expert rule. Whatever their differences, we
can define several shared values: prioritization of economic growth over social development, an
acceptance of the need for political order, and a reluctance to challenge the social hierarchy. We also
note a similar intellectual pedigree: training in economics and/or engineering, extended visits to
Europe and the United States, a fluency in international discourses and an implicit (and often
explicit) discomfort with nationalist language. All these components contribute towards the
elaboration of an internally consistent policy scheme.
The emphasis on economic growth and the implied inevitability of following the dictates of
the international market may serve to legitimate existing social structures. Combined with the
rejection of conflict as unproductive and the faith in the ability of expertise to solve it altogether, the
technocratic mentality can serve as a powerful ally to those sectors wishing to preserve their
advantaged position. Technocratic policy rationales, by dismissing the inherent antagonism
between classes or groups as irrelevant, can make social change appear dysfunctional. Most
technocrats also share a belief that conflicts can be resolved, or better yet, circumvented, through the
optimization of resources. Classes, interest groups, and individuals are in conflict because resources
are distributed inefficiently. The integration of their interests through systemic management will
eliminate social struggle by improving the lot of all. On the other side, technocratic reformism is and
has been a powerful force calling for the dismantling of traditional social structures.   The emphasis
on efficiency and meritocracy can call into question basic assumptions of how the society should be
organized.  Several of the chapters discuss the practically revolutionary fervor of technocrats and
their wish to recreate societies in their own image.
The current congruence between technocratic rule and neoliberal policy should not be
misinterpreted as an intrinsic affinity between technocrats and capitalism. Enough examples exist of
leftist revolutions from above (e.g. Peru 1968) and of more progressive experts (e.g. the ECLA
hegemony of the 1950s and 1960s) as to challenge a mono-ideological definition of technocratic
culture. More important than specific policy contents or preferences, these men (and very few
women) share a set of policy and analytical tool kits (Swidler, 1986) which help determine their
definition of national problems and constrain the set of acceptable policy alternatives.    
The technocratic mentality encompasses a psychological pre-disposition towards specific
types of rationality and discourse. Experts legitimate their rule through appeals to the superiority of
scientific knowledge.  This implies a rejection of the give and take of politics.   The objectivity of
scientific truth must conquer the subjectivity of interests.  Perhaps more importantly, the good of the
"whole" must come before that of its individual parts. The central difference between expert and
political rule is the permissible discourse in decision making or the set of values or criteria by which
different policy options are judged. In a political regime, policies may be proposed or defended by
reference to some set of widely held social values or the interests of a particular group; in a
technocratic regime, the only permissible references are to the relative efficiencies of policies. That
this set of criteria may in fact be structured so as to benefit a particular group is possible and, in fact,
probable. But the public discourse of a technocracy rejects such a linkage.  Perhaps the most
powerful of these cognitive predispositions is an epistemological assumption: that there exists a
unique and universal policy reality which can be analyzed through scientific methods and regards
which no debate is possible. Within the technocratic frame, there is a faith in the possibility of an
optimal solution which all sectors must accept for the greater good. Solutions are not the result of a
balance of power between various interests and classes, but are determined through the application
of relevant models. Given that there is a truth and that objective cause and effect relationships can
be established, politics comes down to determining which policy option best exploits these
relationships so as to achieve a particular goal.  
Comparative and Historical Findings
How do the chapters presented below illuminate these institutional and cultural basis for
expert rule?
Michiel Baud's essay clearly demonstrates that there is relatively little new about the
technocratic phenomenon of the 1990s. Comptean positivism and its adherents were already a
powerful force in Latin American thought and politics in the Nineteenth Century. What is perhaps
most striking about Baud's analysis is how many of the same issues (with less explicit racialist
overtones) continue to dominate Latin American political debate. Perhaps the most important
contribution of this chapter, however, is to identify a critical shift in the arena where experts
predominate. Where previously expertise was limited to purely technical tasks, Baud demonstrates
how the frustrations of failure led to the intrusion of such professionals into more social or political
debates. The campaign to reshape the Dominican tobacco farmer would have its parallels in a
variety of countries (including communist Cuba).   
Miguel Angel Centeno emphasizes the inherent anti-democratic core of technocratic
ideology. Using the example of Friederich Hayek, he demonstrates how faith in a particular
epistemological model can easily preclude the legitimacy of popular participation. By privileging
objective reason, such scientific politics deny the very essence of politics: the representation of
particularistic interests and their resolution in some institutional arena. Even those who are most
concerned with preserving human liberty appear vulnerable to the temptation to discover a policy
truth over which there can be no debate. One of the unanswered questions from the conference is
the extent to which democracies in the region must accept such an ideological and professional
cordon sanitaire in order to survive. Certainly the implications of Hayekian political philosophy
would call for the institution of what may be most optimistically called "constrained democracies".
Patricio Silva provides a detailed analysis of how some of the more common technocratic
ideological attributes are played out in a single biography. Chile’s Pablo Ramírez is a particularly
interesting case because it would be extremely difficult to dismiss him as a creature of traditional
and oligarchic interests. Very much an autonomous political force, Ramírez represents the reformist
wing of the technocratic phenomenon calling into question standard approaches to political rule. In
doing so, however, Ramírez also reveals a certain impatience with the constraints of democracy.
With his faith in incorruptible meritocracy, Ramírez seemed eager to use bureaucratic and
administrative means to achieve ends. His impatience with parliamentary procedure (as
sympathetic as one may be given his circumstances) would not have appeared out of place in 1973.
The case of Ramírez would indicate that technocrats and democratic order have at best an uneasy
relationship.
Following these introductory chapters, we present more detailed analyses of the rise and
rule of experts in contemporary Latin America.
Ben Ross Schneider's chapter closely examines the link between expertise, economic
ideology, and the world system. For Schneider, expertise is not devoid of content. In the end,
experts have to sell themselves to power-holders and this process of political marketing will be
partly shaped by the ideas held by these experts. Domestic powers, in turn, are not completely free
in composing their governments but must take into account the desires and expectations of the
global market on whom almost all nations now depend for their fiscal well-being. The rise of experts
in the 1980s and 1990s cannot, therefore, be divorced from the ascendancy of neoliberalism. These
are not just economists in power, but neoliberal economists who can be expected to send a set of
signals to capital markets. In Schneider's reading, the independent significance of expertise is
relatively small. What counts is not the content of knowledge, but the signal sent by this expertise to
those who really matter.   
Following the emphasis on international influences, Pitou van Dijck analyses the role of the
World Bank in empowering and legitimating experts in the policymaking process of many Latin
American countries. The continuous implementation of structural adjustment programs has helped
to strengthen the relative position of neoliberal technocrats who in fact have became the main
interlocutors of the international financial organizations. Each new adjustment program brings new
technical complexities with it, demanding the presence of local financial experts with an increased
level of knowledge, leading to a kind of deepening in the levels of technocratization of the policy
process. Van Dijck underscores the dangers this process of technocratic deepening can present for
the consolidation of democratic rule in the region, but he contends that the existence of a relative
insulation of technocrats does not necessarily work against democracy. If the accountability of
technocratic institutions is guaranteed, and if policies are designed in consultation with
representatives of the economic or social sectors involved, this could enhance the legitimacy of the
economic policies applied under the new democracies.
Verónica Montecinos agrees with Schneider that the signaling function of expertise is critical
and she demonstrates how this type of knowledge has been used in the process of political
legitimation by a variety of regimes in Chile. Nonetheless, she contends that the professional
affiliation of these elites constitute a key factor. The fact it is economists running large parts of the
Chilean government does make a difference. Certainly the economistic neutrality fit nicely with
what Montecinos calls Pinochet's “missionary discourse”. Perhaps more surprisingly, economists
have played a prominent role in protecting the post-1989 regime from accusations of politicization.
Montecinos provides an excellent description of  the process through which experts were able to
takeover the democratic transition. This empowerment has had its costs, which are beginning to
take their toll on Chilean democracy. Precisely because they have succeeded in depoliticizing so
much of policymaking, Chilean experts have also contributed to a general disenchantment with
politics. This takes two forms: the first is a cultural distancing from a debate that no longer deals
with the large questions of national destiny. The second reflects the move away from politics as
interest representation and leads to citizens losing their intimate association with political parties.
The ambiguous relationship between expertise and the new democracy in Latin America is nicely
illustrated in this chapter as the cure to authoritarian dangers may produce new forms of illness. 
Catherine Conaghan focuses not only on how experts have changed politics, but also have
political involvement has altered the economics profession in Peru. Alone among the cases analyzed
here, the Peruvian state has not been taken over by experts. They surely are prominent and play a
role in defining policy, but they are clearly subservient to the political forces unleashed by the
collapse of APRA. Peruvian economists' only path to power is through the patronage of a political
leader with access to government positions. This dependence has also transformed the profession as
public visibility and contacts have become the most important currency in attaining professional
prestige. Conaghan's description of the political dependence of Peruvian economists would support
those who contend that technocracy is impossible as experts cannot independently sustain their
positions. Unable to construct their own political bases, experts will always be   appendages.
The conflict between bureaucratic and social bases of power informs Ineke van Halsema's
essay on “femocrats” in Brazil. These experts' claim to power is explicitly based on their (supposed)
greater knowledge of the best means through which the state can assist women.  This knowledge,
however, is often based and legitimated through political activity at the grassroots level. This creates
a particularly difficult situation for these elites since they are, almost by definition, on the dividing
line between state and civil society. The manner in which the composition of femocrats in Brazil has
changed and the accompanying institutional transformations do indicate, once again, that the
independent power of experts is limited to their institutional situations. Van Halsema's study also
illustrates the basic conflict between popular, interest based groups and the kinds of responses
favored by a bureaucratic state apparatus.
Carlos Huneeus also focuses on the interaction between political strategy and expertise. He
contrasts the fate of two very different moments of expert influence: Argentina under Alfonsín and
under Menem. As Huneeus makes clear , two critical factors help influence the relative success of
experts in power: the internal dynamics of government and the amount of popular support that
government can expect. The first has to do with access of experts to ultimate decision makers, the
number of competing policy claims, and their ideological unity. The second has to do with the
ability of any government to follow often politically dangerous recommendations. Huneeus
emphasizes that the role of experts must be understood in a wider political context.
This context is precisely what Roderic Camp describes in his analysis of the Mexican
technocrats. Camp is concerned with explaining the institutional and political structures that allow
experts greater influence or even (in the case of Mexico) considerable control over policymaking. He
lists nine factors, but the most important message is that without the right type of institutional
channels which allow a form of bureaucrat to gain power, experts will always be limited to servicing
either popular politicians or military leaders. As these conditions have changed in contemporary
Mexico, so has the urgency to create more participatory mechanisms. Camp analyzes the most
recent work of technocrats as they attempt to create a new Mexican political order, but he remains
uncertain as to their success.
Some Persistent Questions
Despite the research advances of these chapters, there remain several unresolved issues
regarding expert rule in Latin America.   This is not surprising given the relative young age of
“technocratology” in the region.
In the first place, there remain important definitional problems, as many terms such as
technocrat, technician, expert, techno-politician, political technocrat and technopol are used in an
interchangeable manner, without being clear why so many terms are required to indicate one single
actor.  More comparative work is needed in order to locate key common characteristics among
technocrats. The conference made clear that there are many commonalties but also many differences
from country to country.
More attention must be given to the relation between technocrats' power and autonomy.
The chapters in this book are divided as to the relative independence of experts and their relative
power. We need to clarify the conditions which guarantee technocratic autonomy and those which
impose limits on their influence. For example, in our studies, technocrats were found to be
particularly influential under two very different circumstances. In Mexico, the extreme stability of
the system allowed internal players to establish a great deal of control. But, transitions such as the
Chilean of 1989 also seem to produce special conditions that enhanced the relative autonomy of
technocrats in charge of the economic policies. A related issue is the possible effect of increasing
integration on the power of technocrats.  Certainly the example of the European Union would
indicate that such agreements will give a great deal of power to experts.  Will NAFTA and Mercosur
have the same effect?
The relationship of technocrats to politicians and political parties seems to be much more
complex than it often has been assumed. All participants agreed that this is always a tense
relationship. In the 1990s, however, we may see greater mixing of these two types requiring a
reconsideration of the relationship of experts to popular politics. We note that experts in Argentina, 
Chile and Mexico were very good at playing organizational games, but there are also examples of
failure (Peru, Brazilian femocrats).  We also need to investigate the causal relationship between the
rise of technocrats and the apparent crisis of almost all political parties in Latin America.  Which is
responsible for which? 
We as yet have little information on the relationship between state technocrats and experts
in civil society.  The relationship between these trends has been the subject of much study in the
United States (Brint 1994), but we know relatively little about  the parallel technocratization in
business, to cite one obvious example.  We also know next to nothing about popular attitudes
toward the technocrats.  Anecdotal evidence indicates a great deal of opposition to many of the
policies with which they are associated, but at least in Chile, they seem to be perceived as guardians
against the return to the ideologization of politics in the 1970s.  We certainly do not posses
comparable time series data on the rise and fall of popular support. 
Finally, it has become clear that question of technocratic ideology remains perhaps the most
difficult issue in the current debate, demanding a more elaborate analysis of the specific set of ideas
and ideals which guide the action of Latin American technocrats.   One theme that practically
authors and conference participants emphasized was the problematic marriage of expert rule and
democracy.
Technocratic Democracies?
Since the 1980s, Latin America has experienced a democratic revolution. Yet the new
democracies are very different from the standard of not long ago. In the 1990s we have seen the
virtual disappearance of populist parties (e.g. APRA in Peru) or their transformation into political
organizations with a modified ideological and doctrinal orientation (e.g. PRI in Mexico). In some
extreme cases, like peronismo in Argentina, the main features of the political movement have been
transformed beyond recognition. For this reason, the democrats who have succeeded the
authoritarian rulers are quite different actors from their counterparts of the 1960s and early 1970s.
The fact that this process of democratization has occurred at the same as the increasing
domination by technocrats has called into question the relationship between expert rule and
popular participation. The elective affinity between technocrats and authoritarian regimes has been
often noted (Collier, 1979). Certainly the historical record in Latin America indicates that experts
have some affinity with authoritarian rule. Porfirian Mexico remains the prototypical example of a
positivist regime. The ingenieros of Ibañez and the money doctors of Kemmerer found it easier to
work with dictators than with democrats. In the 1960s and 1970s, economic experts gladly joined
hands with generals throughout the continent.  
In the 1990s, however, the coexistence of these experts with the institutions of representative
democracy has made the application of old regime categories impractical, imprecise, and often
deceptive. No one would argue that 1988-89 has not changed Chile or that Brazil and Argentina
have not become more democratic in the past few years. However, we may wish to ask whether
they have become less technocratic.   
We would like to suggest that the past decade has seen the need for a new political
morphology in which political and economic characteristics are blended in new ways. Specifically
we would like to discuss the appearance of what may be called Technocratic Democracies. The
combination of the formal institutions of representative democracy with the effective control by
expert elites may provide a much needed conceptual clarification to the process of democratic
transition in Latin America.
In Technocratic-Democracies, elected representatives still have nominal control over the final
decision making, but the framing of policy alternatives is largely in the hands of experts. That is,
some degree of interest representation remains and elected representatives retain a veto over
government policies, but these have become so complex so as to prohibit debate on all the points
covered within them and require a level of comprehension beyond the capacities of the majority of
the population. Simultaneously, the qualifications for becoming a politician increasingly include at
least informal acquaintance or association with the language of economics. In the most extreme case,
the distinction between technical experts and politicians disappears as the former establish their
dominance over all political institutions.   
There are a variety of paths to technocratic democracy. In the case of plutocracies, external
authorities may impose new economic rationales and political respectability (e.g. El Salvador). More
politically oriented authoritarian regimes may see the rise of a cadre of experts through internal
channels (Mexico) or have the new order imposed following the collapse of the status quo ante
(Eastern Europe). Democratic regimes may also increasingly find their policy choices constrained by
what is technically feasible. Certainly in Western Europe and the United States, politico-economic
choices appear to be increasingly limited to a narrow wavelength. Of greatest relevance to our case,
several of the Asian Tigers (such as Taiwan and South Korea) have increased at least nominal or
institutional manifestations of democracy while maintaining considerable control by expert cadres
(cf. Haggard and Kaufman, 1992, 1995).  
Technocratic-Democracies depend on the existence of a relatively wide consensus regarding
the basic values of the society. This frees technocrats from having to manage precisely those
ideological questions which cannot be dealt with scientifically. For example, technocrats are capable
of managing debates on tax rates, but they are less able to rule in a setting where the concept of
private property remains problematic. This does not preclude public debates about other issues
(again, for example, human rights). But it does imply that certain items are for all intents and
purposes, off the public agenda.
This consensus is precisely what we may see developing in Latin America during the 1990s.
With spectacular unanimity, all the countries in the continent now share what John Williamson has
called the Washington Consensus, which prioritizes free markets, private property, and
globalization (cf Haggard and Webb, 1994). Political opponents no longer argue about different
visions of society, but compete over their qualifications and capacity to play the global market game.
Lula spent much of his 1994 presidential campaign reassuring private capital and extolling the
patience of Brazilian labor while Fernando Henrique Cardoso basked in the approval of the Council
for Foreign Relations. Carlos Lage emphasizes the discipline of the Cuban work-force while
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in Mexico stresses his support for NAFTA. The ex-Chilean Minister of
Economic Affairs Carlos Ominami praises the dynamic role of the markets and Pérez de Cuellar
becomes the “progressive” candidate in the latest Peruvian elections.    
This consensus is not only critical to the development of democracy in the Latin America of
the 1990s, but cannot be understood without reference to the politics of expertise. Without getting
into old arguments about the relative values of bread and ballots, we want to ask how the ever-
increasing dominance by expert knowledge has both encouraged this latest wave of democracy and
limited its real participatory potential. By constraining the choice of alternatives, expert rule has
made democracy safe for neoliberal policies. That is, democracy is no longer feared since its
outcomes are increasingly predictable. In this way, the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm and
the predominance of expert authority has freed the continent (at least temporarily) from
authoritarian rule.
We remain concerned, however, for the long term basis of democracy in Latin America.    
Precisely because these policies involve sacrifice and scarcity for significant segments of the
population, technocratic rule and neoliberalism may undermine the long term viability of these
regimes. Army coups in Caracas, urban disintegration in Rio de Janeiro, and rebellion in Chiapas all
serve to indicate that experts cannot expect to rule without either authoritarian guards or popular
support. The latter requires that greater attention be paid to the social and political costs of economic
efficiency. The former means a return to the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian state. The belief that
technocratic domination can come without blood and without compromise is the true fatal conceit of
the late twentieth Century.